The author
discusses the recent
theoretical competition law and economics is- sues in light of the 2004 EU competition law enforcement reform.
It aligns the US antitrust developments in the
academic literature and the judiciary prec- edents with the European
efforts to implement a more economic
approach to competition law.
The transatlantic divide is closing due to converging forces, but the opposition slows down the convergence process
in both jurisdictions. The past unchanged case law still limits European
competition law reform. However, the empirical analysis demonstrates that the European
Commission followed the American example much more than might be
concluded only from the wordings
of the official texts. The Commission enforcement became more focused on cartels with heavier fines,
and the pressure
on other compe- tition law subfields, similarly to
US antitrust enforcement, relaxed if we em- pirically examine the case-level data. The reform did not cause more litigation
because substantive law remained unchanged. Hence, there was no additional legal uncertainty, and in
judiciary procedures, firms mainly reacted to higher imposed fines.
Keywords:
EU competition law, US antitrust, competition law and economics,
2004 reform, economics-based approach, European Commission, empirical assessment.