The Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of the Economics-Based 2004 EU Competition Law Reform

The author discusses the recent theoretical competition law and economics is- sues in light of the 2004 EU competition law enforcement reform. It aligns the US antitrust developments in the academic literature and the judiciary prec- edents with the European efforts to implement a more economic approach to competition law. The transatlantic divide is closing due to converging forces, but the opposition slows down the convergence process in both jurisdictions. The past unchanged case law still limits European competition law reform. However, the empirical analysis demonstrates that the European Commission followed the American example much more than might be concluded only from the wordings of the official texts. The Commission enforcement became more focused on cartels with heavier fines, and the pressure on other compe- tition law subfields, similarly to US antitrust enforcement, relaxed if we em- pirically examine the case-level data. The reform did not cause more litigation because substantive law remained unchanged. Hence, there was no additional legal uncertainty, and in judiciary procedures, firms mainly reacted to higher imposed fines.

Keywords: EU competition law, US antitrust, competition law and economics, 2004 reform, economics-based approach, European Commission, empirical assessment.