The National Review
Commission is a distinct, independent, and autonomous state body occupying two seemingly incompatible roles: it functions as a court or
tribunal under Article
267 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, while also acting as a mere supervisory body within the Slovenian legal order. Case-law have delineated
these dual roles, firstly through the case-law of the Court of Justice of the
European Union and secondly via the settled case-law of domestic courts. From
this perspective, the necessity for judicial oversight is neither imperative nor mandated. In
terms of legal certainty, such a scenario is less than ideal. Amendment C of the Legal Protection in Public Procurement
Procedures Act introduces a form of judicial oversight that is commensurate
with the remit of the National Review Commission. This ap- plies particularly when the Commission, as a state authority exercising its legal powers (ex iure imperii), adjudicates on the
rights and legal interests of revi- sion applicants. The introduction of (limited) administrative dispute demon-
strates the recognized need for judicial oversight. However, a review of the
jurisdiction of the administrative court
in administrative dispute
proceedings under the Legal Protection in Public Procurement Procedures Act, reveals
that the ultimate solution
does not adequately ensure effective judicial
protection.
Key words: National Review
Commission, administrative act, acta iure
imperii, acta iure gestionis, sui generis legal authority.