The National Council, Slovenia’s second parliamentary chamber, was created as a compromise of different ideas during the formation of the Slovenian Consti- tution. This article traces the evolution of the idea of a bicameral parliamentary system from the late 1980s of the 20th century to the beginning of the 1990s when this idea was embedded in the current Constitution through the draft and proposal of the Constitution. The compromise reached during the draft- ing of the Constitution affected the law regulatory arrangement of the National Council, leading to numerous practical challenges. The aim of this article is to explore the spectrum of potential amendments to the constitutional regulation of the National Council in several directions, spanning from abolition to trans- formation and modification of the existing regulation of the National Council. In the remaining part of the article, a change to the regulation of the procedure for reconsidering the law is presented with the aim to bolster the quality of the adopted legislation. As a solution, it is proposed that, instead of voting on the law again, which represents a pointless prolongation of the legislative proce- dure, the arrangement de lege ferenda enables a discussion of the disputed pro- visions of the law and a decision on possible changes to the disputed part of the law, thereby obviating unnecessary further procedures for amending the law.

Key words: National Council, Constitution, second chamber, upper house, suspensive veto, reconsideration of a law.

The Constitution of the Republic of Slovenia prohibits retroactive legal effect of statutes and provides four cumulative conditions that must be met for retroactive legal effect to be exceptionally permissible. The theory and constitutional case law in this area are extensive and must be considered by the legislator when enacting a law with retroactive effect. However, the Constitution does not specifically regulate the retrospectivity of legal effects, which is why constitutional case law has developed it based on the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, which is rooted in the rule of law. Retrospective effect, as opposed to retroactive effect, is permissible, but the legislator must avoid acting arbitrarily and may worsen the legal position of the addressees only if there is a substantive reason based on an overriding, legitimate and constitutionally permissible public interest, having regard to the principles of proportionality and equality before the law. When amending an existing regulation which worsens the legal position of the addressees, the legislator must weigh legislative interference against the principle of the protection of legitimate expectations.

Keywords: retroactivity, retrospectivity, principle of the protection of legitimate expectations, public interest, acquired rights.