The article presents a somewhat broader analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court
decision in the Hobby Lobby case,
by which the court also recognised the right
to freedom of religion to (some) corporations. Proceeding from the key em-
phases of the legal-theoretical concept
of the legal personality of
corporations
/ legal persons, it also flirts with positive legal
regulation, in the European legal environment as well. In addition to
the known theories on the nature of cor- porations / legal persons, it
emphasises in particular the assumption of inde- pendence of the latter and the trend of assimilation in the field of legal capac-
ity. From the perspective of legal personality as a set of associated rights,
the article also touches
upon the right to freedom
of religion in both legal systems.
In addition to positive legal regulations, it stresses the definition of the concept of the term person
in the light of freedom
of religion, as well as the individual and the collective aspect of
the latter. In doing so, it seeks answers to closely related questions of legal theory
and positive law about whose right to freedom
of religion could be if/when it is invoked by corporations / legal persons (the
right of the latter, the right of their owners or perhaps
even both), or how this would affect the generally accepted
position on the independence of the legal personality of corporations / legal persons
and, last but not least,
on the under- standing of legal personality in general.
Key words: legal personality,
corporation, legal person, the right to religious freedom, Hobby Lobby.