On the occasion of its 25th anniversary, the Slovenian Constitutional Court organised
a conference in June 2016 at Bled, attended by many illustrious guests
from other European constitutional courts and some international courts. This
article presents a brief overview of the topics discussed while endeavouring
to place them in a broader theoretical setting. In this discussion, I take as my
starting point Ronald Dworkin’s witty comparison of constitutional courts
with the secular papacy. His quip can be understood as a reminder that constitutional
courts have become a place where all important social issues are finally
settled. In the second half of the previous century, the scope of questions
claimed by the constitutional courts and by others to belong to their jurisdiction
has increased, putting the constitutional courts in the forefront of a social
and political life. This process has been helped in no small measure by the
evolving nature of the constitutional reasoning. The language of human rights
increasingly employed by the constitutional courts is understood and accepted
by all. Dworkin’s penetrating remark can also be understood as underscoring
the trust almost universally enjoyed by the constitutional courts. An essential
part of the reason for the faith citizens display towards the constitutional
courts’ decisions stems from their substantive engagement with the issues at
hand and with the intuitively persuasive balancing increasingly employed by
the constitutional courts. Finally, Dworkin’s remark can also be understood as
highlighting the claim of infallibility that at least some constitutional courts
put forward. This problem opens a plethora of exciting theoretical and philosophical
issues regarding the relationship of the constitutional courts towards
regular, European, and international courts.
Key words: constitutional court, federalism, judicial review, legal reasoning,
human rights, judicial supremacy