The Dialectic of Legal Principle – The Contradic¬tion and Arbitrariness of the Decision

One of the main features of legal theory after Second World War was the interest, dedicated to the role of the principles in the legal discourse. Several tools were developed that enable the use of legal principles (the most significant author is R. Dworkin). In the article, the reasons are demonstrated that the reference to legal principles is regarded as more demanding as the reference to the rules. The decisive is the circumstance that the principles cannot be used in the all-or-nothing fashion. This is the consequence of the fact that the principle as such includes contradictory structure: the principle in concrete case is unavoidably simultaneously respected and not respected. This is demanding situation that implicates the element of the arbitrariness in the decision-making. The concept will be introduced that is capable to confront this feature and manage to keep it on the margin. To put it differently, it is about the concept which enables the insistence on the one right answer thesis although the moment of the arbitrariness is part of every decision. 

Key words: philosophy of law, theory of law, legal principle, arbitrariness