Constitutional Review of the Autonomy of the Parliament

The autonomy of the Parliament is the consequence of ensuring a functioning system of checks and balances, and it derives from the principle of the separation of powers. When reviewing the autonomy of the Parliament, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia derives from the constitutional principle of the separation of powers and it assesses the relationship between the autonomy of the first and the second houses of the Parliament. Procedural autonomy is the basis for the right and the obligation of both houses of the Parliament to govern the organisation of their business and work with internal legal acts by themselves. The constitutional right of the second house of the Parliament to a suspensive veto means that the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia may require (only) a re-vote about the law as a whole; however, it is not allowed to reopen a discussion on the law. The decisions of the (President of the) National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia regarding the referendum tasks might have already formed a parliamentary tradition, and their compliance with the provisions of the Constitution has also been confirmed by the Constitutional Court. Regarding administrative autonomy, the Constitutional Court also reviewed the requirement for professional performance of the presidential function of the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia. An important decision which concerned the financial autonomy of the Parliament was that the executive branch may not decide regarding management of immovable property used by the Parliament. 

Keywords: principle of the separation of powers, system of checks and balances, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Slovenia, the legislative branch, the Parliament, the autonomy of the Parliament, (incomplete) bicameralism of the Parliament, the National Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia, the National Council of the Republic of Slovenia.